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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Cum.
Supp. 1994).
ISSUES AND APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1. Did the district court err in finding that the
Decree of Divorce in this matter was not ambiguous regarding the
division of proceeds from the sale of the marital residence.
Standard of Review. "Findings of fact . . . shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous."

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

"Under that standard, [appellate courts] do not set aside the
trial court's factual findings unless they are against the clear
weight of the evidence or [the court] otherwise reach[es] a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987).
Issue 2.

Did the district court err in finding that

Defendant owed the Plaintiff child support in the amount of
$1,982.04, representing the difference between the child support
paid by the Defendant and the amount set forth in the child
support guidelines.

1

Standard of Review,1

"Findings of fact . . . shall not

be set aside unless clearly erroneous."

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

f,

Under that standard, [appellate courts] do not set aside the

trial court's factual findings unless they are against the clear
weight of the evidence or [the court] otherwise reach[es] a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987).
Issue 3.
Defendant's

offset

Did the district court err in finding that
for one-half

of all medical

expenses he

purportedly incurred on behalf of the parties' minor children was
$1,890.83.
Standard of Review.2

"Findings of fact . . . shall not

be set aside unless clearly erroneous."

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

"Under that standard, [appellate courts] do not set aside the
trial court's factual findings unless they are against the clear
weight of the evidence or [the court] otherwise reach[es] a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."

In his brief, the Defendant likewise cites the
inappropriate standard of review for this issue. In its
order, the District Court made an explicit finding
regarding Defendant's child support arrearage (R. 264)
and therefore the appropriate standard of review would be
the one cited above.
In his brief, the Defendant cites the inappropriate
standard of review for this issue. In its order, the
District Court made an explicit finding regarding the
medical and dental expenses for the parties minor
children (R. 265) and therefore the appropriate standard
of review would be the one cited above.
2

Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson
Cattle Co. , 74* P.?.* n7fi. 1177 (Utah 1987),
Issue 4.

Did the district court err in finding that the

Defendant failed to pay -alimony in the sum of $5,083.00 prior to

February 1994, and consequently enteri i ig judgmei i t :i i fa i ? o. i :* < >f the
Plaintiff for said amount.
Standard of Review.3

"Findings of fact

be set aside unless clearly erroneous . "

, shal ] not

utal i R

C:i \ ? P. 52(a).

"Under that standard, [appellate courts] do not set aside the
tria ] coi u : 1 s fc ic 'tual findings unless they are against the clear
weight

of

definite

tl le evidence or
and

[the court] otherwise

firm conviction

that

a mistake

react i[es] • a

has been made ' ""

Western Kane County Special service District No

1 v

Jackson

*

awarding

Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1QR7K
Issue

5.

Di ci tl le district

Plaint ill ill t.oiiK»y f>ps

IIIIMI C D H I S

Standard of Review.

court

err

:i n the amount of $4,308.00.

Absent patent error or clear abuse

of discretion, •-.- appellate court will not disturb a trial court's
award or aiti •• . fees.

Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 524

(Utah 1978).
Issue 6.

The Plaintiff

attorney fiv-es i i appeal.

is entitled to «

award of

• "

In his brief, the Defendant
likewise cites the
inappropriate standard of review for this issue. In its
order, the District Court made an explicit finding
regarding Defendant's failure to pay alimony during the
relevant period (R. 264) and therefore the appropriate
standard of review would be the one cited above.

3

Relevant Law.

"Generally, when the trial court awards

fees in a domestic action to the party who then substantially
prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on
appeal. Lynqle v. Lynqle, 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1992) (citing
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
There
ordinances,

are

rules

no
and

constitutional
regulations

provisions,

whose

statutes,

interpretation

is

determinative of the instant appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from a final order and judgment entered
in the Third Judicial District Court on January 20, 1995.

(R.

272) .
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition.
1. The parties to this action were divorced pursuant

to a decree of divorce entered on February 8, 1991.
2.

(R. 49-54).

The Decree herein explicitly provided:

That plaintiff be and she is
hereby awarded the use of the home and
real property located at 2197 West
13250 South, Riverton, Utah, until such
time as one of the following contingencies occur, to wit: (a) plaintiff
remarries; (b) plaintiff cohabitates
with an individual of the opposite sex;
(c) youngest child reaches majority;
(d) plaintiff desires to sell said
home; (e) plaintiff no longer resides
in said home.
When the first of the above
contingencies occur, said home will be
immediately placed for sale and from

the proceeds from said sale, the sums
will be distributed as follows:
(a)
all costs and expenses of sale including real estate commissions; (b) the
balance due on the mortgage; (c) any
costs of repairs to sell the home; (d)
Plaintiff will be reimbursed for a n y
reduction of mortgage commencing in
February, 1991, until date of sale; and
(e) plaintiff
and defendant
will
equally divide the remaining b a l a n c e .
(

:

i

. :,;jt on or about Octuijet

sold the marital residence #
al ] sor t :,s of claims

» /, , 14'M, t lie paiiic

t which time the Defendant concocted

against

the Plaintiff

proceeds from the sale and threatened

;

•

educe

her net

..-:•: * -If tl 1a I: \ u: 0 ess

she paid such claims, the closing would :w

proceed.

(R. 338-

339) .
. 4
title action :

^hat

subsequently, the Defendant

I .i led a quit"'I

effort to recover the funds he claims were

o*

:otiations al the time of closing.

(R. 78)
5.
Modifier*I

Defendant also filed a Verified Petition

HI ul UiHivoe

for

of Divorce, seeking to terminate alimony,

recover certain proceeds from the sale of the marital residence,
and

recover

reimbursements

purpoi 1 «"1<J i Y piiiii i»v I u ni
6
the Commissioner

for
| IN'

medical

and

dental

expenses

121 125)

That at a temporary hearing held i n this matter,
found that

"the parties 1

factual dispute

approprj ate] y r € 'So] v eel i i i fa v or of the P] a :i i it i f f

5

""

is
i .

7.

That the Plaintiff filed a Counterpetition for

Modification of Decree of Divorce, claiming:

(1) that based upon

the income of the parties, child support should be modified for
the remaining two minor children; (2) delinquent alimony in the
amount of $5,083.00; child support arrearages;

and reimbursement

for amounts paid for medical and dental expenses for the minor
children-

(R. 172-176).
8.

That

the

above

cases

were

ultimately

con-

solidated prior to trial.
9.

That after trial, the court entered findings of

fact, conclusions

of

law, and

order

and

judgment

ruling,

in

pertinent part that:
(a) Defendant's Petition to Modify was denied;
(b) Defendant's quiet title cause of
action was dismissed;
(c) Based upon the parties' respective incomes, the child support amount would
be modified to $727.00 per month;
(d)

Plaintiff was granted judgment

against Defendant in the amount of $5,083.00
for delinquent alimony;

against

(e)

Plaintiff was granted judgment

the

Defendant

in

the

amount

of

$1,982.04 for delinquent child support;
(f) That the Defendant was awarded a
set off in the amount of $1,890.83 for one-

6

half of the children's medical and dental
expenses;
(g)

Tha t the Plaintiff was granted

judgment for attorney fees and costs in the
amount of $4,308 00
(R.

262-272).
10. Defendant appealed from that order and judgment.

(R. 273).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Issue 1.

In the instant action, the decree of divorce

with respect to sale of the marital residence is abundai it J; y c ] ee i •
and explicitly provides for those expenses that will adjust the
parti es ' I :i ] I ,i mate distribution.

Under no stretch of reason could

repayment of the parties' parents fit wit!

'"

expenses of sale" on "any cost of repairs."
Issue 2.

Defendant

argument that he prepaid child

support in the amount of $ 7,*oo.00 is without merit.

Further,

such purported agreement between the parties contravenes public
p

support does not necessarily inure to the

respective parties

he parties' minor children.

Pi nal ] y,

the evidence was sufficient to support the court's finding that
Dot e n< id mi ml w»is in iicie^tl di»1 m ni|ucnt in liis child support.
Issue 3. Defendant's evidence at trial regarding medical
and dental payments on behalf of the parties' minor children was
i

,H "i i' I 1"11 s (inJ i"pen: t e d cJ a :i in.

7

0f par ti ci i] an note ,

the Defendant lacked documentation to verify thousands of dollars
in medical and dental payments which he claimed he paid.
Issue 4.

There was sufficient evidence at trial to

support the district court's

finding that the Defendant was

delinquent in his alimony payments in the amount of $5,083.00.
Specifically, there was adequate evidence that the Defendant
regularly paid the Plaintiff lesser sums than those set forth in
the Decree of Divorce.
Issue 5. An award of attorney fees is routinely based on
the parties' respective abilities to pay the same. In the instant
action, there was evidence that the Plaintiff was unemployed and
that

the

Defendant

earned

$3,259.00

per

month,

thereby

demonstrating the Plaintiff's inability to pay her own attorney
fees and her attending need. The court further found that the
Plaintiff was required to employ counsel to defend the actions
which were brought by the Defendant and ultimately dismissed by
the court. Finally, the court found that such fees and costs were
necessary and reasonable based upon the time and expenditures made
on behalf of the Plaintiff.

Consequently, the attorney award

should be affirmed.
Issue 6.

Generally, if a party in a domestic action is

awarded attorney fees at the trial level and then subsequently
prevails on appeal, that party is awarded reasonable attorney fees
for

such

appeal.

Here,

in

the

event

that

the

Plaintiff

substantially prevails on appeal, this court should award attorney
fees and costs incurred therein.
8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IN THIS CASE WAS
NOT AMBIGUOUS AS TO THE DIVISION OF THE PROCEEDS
FROM THE MARITAL RESIDENCE.
The Defendant irrationally argues that the Decree of
Divorce in this case is ambiguous.

Specifically, he argues that

the Decree of Divorce does not define the term "all costs and
expenses of sale" to either include or exclude the repayments of
certain loans to the parties' parents.
p. 13.

See Appellant's brief at

In an attempt to bolster his argument, Defendant cites

Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah App. 1990) for the
proposition that "[language in a written document is ambiguous if
the words used may be understood to support two or more plausible
meanings." Further, Defendant cites that language from the same
case that "[a] court is justified in determining that a contract
or order is ambiguous if the terms are either unclear or missing."
In the case at bar, Defendant's reliance on Whitehouse is
wholly misguided.
distribution

The court's language regarding the ultimate

of the proceeds

from the marital

residence is

abundantly clear and in no way lends itself to two or more
plausible meanings.

Specifically, the language that "all costs

and expenses of sale" would be paid prior to distribution has only
one meaning, to wit: that any expenses directly associated to the
sale of the marital residence, i.e., real estate commissions,
advertising, etc. would be deducted prior to any distribution.
Even the most illogical stretch of reason would not contemplate
9

that such language would

include repayment

of

loans to the

parties' respective parents.4
By arguing that such straightforward, simple language as
"all costs and expenses of sale" is ambiguous so as to include the
repayment of loans to the parties' parents, the Defendant is
attempting to rewrite the Decree of Divorce. There is absolutely
no evidence of such loans in the decree, nor is there any evidence
that repayment of the same was contemplated at the time of the
entry of the Decree. Accord-ingly, Defendant's failure to address
this issue at the time of the Decree does not warrant some finding
that simple

language in the Decree is ambiguous so as to include

wholly unrelated and unaddressed issues within the same.5
Finally, Defendant argues that the Decree of Divorce
should be construed against the Plaintiff inasmuch as Plain-tiff's
counsel drafted such Decree, citing Home Savings and Loan v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur., 817 P.2d 341, 347-48 (Utah App. 1991).

In so

arguing, Defendant evidences a complete misunderstanding of the
fundamental judicial tenet that the district court is presumed to
be the drafter of the ultimate decree or order.

Such is

particularly true in this case where the decree was simply a
4

Inasmuch as the subject language in the decree is not
ambiguous as claimed by the Defendant, the trial court
was not required to employ the applicable rules of
contract interpretation.

5

A further point that Defendant fails to address is that
the parties' respective parents possibly retain some
cause of action for recovery of the monies owed to the
Plaintiff and Defendant. Consequently, the fact that the
parties failed to include the repayment of the same in
their Decree of Divorce is hardly fatal.
10

restatement of the stipulation entered into between the parties.
Therefore, Defendant's suggestion that the clear, unambiguous
language in the Decree should somehow be construed against the
Plaintiff is without merit.6
Based

on

the

foregoing,

the

district

court's

determination that the relevant language in the parties'

Decree

of Divorce was not ambiguous should be affirmed.
POINT II
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL TO
SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT HAD CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES
IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,982.04.
Defendant challenges the district court's finding that he
owes

child

support

in the amount of

$1,982.04.

Defendant

initially argues that "if the trial court erred in not finding the
decree of divorce ambiguous, the trial court erred in finding that
Defendant owes any sum for delinquent child support." Defendant's
Brief at 15. However, such point is moot since the Plaintiff has
previously established that the decree of divorce is patently
clear.
As part of the foregoing argument, Defendant claims that the
parties entered into a private agreement that certain funds
received at closing on the marital residence represented prepaid
child

support.

agreement.
6

However,

the

Defendant

misrepresents

such

In fact, and as testified to by the Plaintiff:

Consequently, the cases cited by Defendant for this
proposition are not controlling since those cases all
involve private agreements presumably drafted by one
party.
11

What I agreed to was while we were
sitting in the closing, it wasn't closing and
I had a home waiting to close on and Sandy
kept refusing to close on the home and beings
the fact I had a couple-week-old baby and we
were in a motel, I was willing to do what I
needed to and that's when I said I will just
pay what I need to pay. I will go without
child support for a year so I have a place to
go with my children, and that's what I did.
I was desperate at the time. I needed to do
what I could for my kids so we could get in a
home.
(R. 338)
Accordingly, there was hardly an agreement, rather, the
Defendant coerced the Plaintiff in agreeing to waive her child
support in consideration for proceeds to which she was already
legally entitled. Inasmuch as this court has previously held that
such "agreements" are unlawful since child support does not inure
to the parents but to the child (ren), such is nevertheless
unenforceable.
Notwithstanding, there was sufficient evidence to support
the following finding of the district court:
9.
That pursuant to the statute of the
State of Utah and the Divorce Decree provision
as to child support for the two (2) remaining
children in custody of the Plaintiff, and based
upon Plaintiff's Counter-Petition, the child
support is established at Seven Hundred TwentyThree
($723.00) Dollars per month, and
Plaintiff is granted judgment against Defendant
for arrearage in child support of One Thousand
Nine Hundred Eighty-Two and 04/100 ($1,982.04)
Dollars, being the difference between the child
support paid by Defendant and the child support
schedule
amount
pursuant
to
Plaintiff's
Exhibit.
Finding of Fact No. 9 (R. 264).

12

As set forth in the foregoing finding, and a point
completely ignored by Defendant in his brief, the child support
award was modified at the time of the hearing in this matter to
reflect the proper level of child support pursuant to the uniform
guidelines and based upon the parties' respective incomes as
stipulated by the parties and ultimately set forth in the parties'
divorce decree.

Specifically, the Decree provides:

8.
That defendant be and he is hereby
ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $196.33
per child per month, a total of $589.00 per
month, for the support and maintenance of the
minor children, . . . with the express
provision that pursuant to the statute of the
State of Utah that when each child reaches
majority the child support shall be adjusted
based on the Child Support Schedule.
Decree of Divorce, Finding No. 8.
Consequently, inasmuch as one of the parties* minor
children had reached the age of majority, the court, pursuant to
the Decree of Divorce, simply recalculated the support amount,
representing the difference between that amount paid by the
Defendant since the relevant period and the appropriate amount
pursuant to the uniform child support guidelines. See Finding of
Fact

No. 9.

Exhibit

19 and

the Plaintiff's

testimony were certainly sufficient
court's

finding

regarding

child

to support

support

corroborating
the district

arrearage

and

the

Defendant has not overcome his burden of demonstrating that such
finding is clearly erroneous; therefore, that finding should be
upheld.

13

POINT III
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING
REGARDING ALIMONY ARREARAGE.
Defendant also challenges the district court's finding
that he owes Plaintiff back alimony in the amount of $5,083.00,
representing arrearages from January 1991 through August 1994. In
addition

to his testimony, which he claims

controverts the

finding, he relies on Exhibits 13 and 17 from the Office of
Recovery Services. Notwithstanding, there was sufficient evidence
to support the court's ultimate finding.
Of

particular

significance,

there

was

sufficient

testimony and corroborating evidence to support the district
court's finding.

With respect to alimony arrearage, Plaintiff

testified as follows:
Q. (By Mr. Spencer) You claim in your Counter
Petition that Sandy is in arrears in his
alimony payments in the amount of $5,083; is
that correct?
A. (By Plaintiff) I do, uh-huh.
Q.

Upon what do you base that allegation?

A. Well, when Sandy and I first got divorced
we--he paid me in cash. We kind of just—it
was pretty easy going. We kind of bent for
each other and there would be times he wouldn't
have enough. There would be, you know, so he
wouldn't give me enough, and there would be
other times when I needed--when he did the
house payments, you know, and he paid the house
payments because I told him, I said that would
be easier, and oftentimes he might not have
enough for the child support or the alimony and
so we worked out the child support, that there
were times that Sandy would come and maybe give
me $200 on the alimony and then he'd give me
$175 and that's kind of how it worked on and
14

off and that's where I came up with that
because there was oftentimes that it kind of
went back and forth like that,
Q. Do you have any records to show Sandy did
not pay you?
A. No, I told him that,
I told him it was
just a figure but I think it was a very
conservative figure.
(R. 333) (Emphasis added).
Further, the Plaintiff testified:
Q. (By Mr. 01 sen)
alimony?

You were awarded

$400

A.

(By Plaintiff) Yes.

Q.

And you're claiming $5,093 delinquency?

A.

Yes.

Q. And that was the best you could come with
as far as your remembering, et cetra? There's
no accounting records; is that correct?
A.

No, I just came to a conservative number.

Q.

Is that a liberal or a conservative figure?

A.

It's conservative.

Q. You think it's greater than that, but you
know it's at least that?
A.

Yes.

(R. 352).
Furthermore,
delinquent alimony.

Exhibit

18

provided

an

accounting

of

Accordingly, the foregoing testimony and

evidence conclusively demonstrates that there was sufficient
evidence to support the district court's finding; therefore, such
finding was not clearly erroneous.

15

Moreover, testimony by both the Plaintiff and Defendant
controverts the reliability of Exhibit 13 and 17 from the Utah
State Office of Recovery
testimony demonstrates
reflect

the

payment

Services.

First, Defendant's

that such records did
history

between

the

not

own

accurately

Plaintiff

and

the

Defendant.
Q. (By Mr. Spencer) Do you make your alimony
payments directly to [the Plaintiff] or to the
State of Utah?
A. (By Defendant) Part of the time directly
to her, part of the time to the State of Utah.
Q. When did you start making payments to the
State of Utah?
A.

As of January.

Q.

Of which year?

A.

January of 1994.

Q. Now, going back to the time previous to
January of 1994, did you make the payments to
Regina in cash?
A.

Sometimes in cash, sometimes in checks.

R. 297-98).
By Defendant's own admission, therefore, he made no
payments to the Office of Recovery Services until January of 1994,
and the finding and judgment represented arrearages from January
1991 to August 1994.

Accordingly, the records for periods from

January 1991 to January 1994 admitted into evidence by Defendant
could only be confirmed by the Plaintiff who reported to Office of
Recovery Services, who testified as follows:
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Q. (By Mr. Spencer) Did you tell anyone at
the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services
that Sandy wasn't paying you alimony?
A. (By Plaintiff) When I went into the Office
of Recovery Services, I went in and told them I
was going to collect on child support and they
told me at that time that we would need to do
alimony. To be honest with you, I did not do
the back alimony.
At that time I was very
concerned on getting enough food for my
children. When I went to Recovery Services, I
had told Sandy that even if he would just
provide food and maybe pay the utility bills, I
wouldn't go to Recovery Services, that I needed
that. That's what we needed.
Q. Now, when you went to Recovery Services,
you did go to Recovery Services this year?
A.

I did, yes.

Q. Did you tell them at that time that there
was an alimony arrearage due and payable?
A. I did and
everything.
{Exhibit 13]
the arrears.
Q.

I told her, though, when we went,
She said to fill out the papers
on the arrears and I filled out
I didn't go back for the other.

Did you claim arrears for 1991?

A. I did not. I told you that. I did not
claim arrears for anything. I did not go back
for the back alimony.
(R. 333-34) (emphasis added).
Consequently,

the

Plaintiff's

testimony

candidly

indicates that when she went to Office of Recovery Services, she
noted on the requisite forms that the Defendant was not in arrears
on alimony payments inasmuch as she did not want to collect on
alimony arrearages through ORS. However, such action on the part
of the Plaintiff does not vitiate the fact that the Defendant was
indeed in arrearage with respect to alimony or that Plaintiff had
17

a legal right to collect the same through judicial proceedings.
Therefore, Defendant's reliance on such is misplaced.
POINT IV
Defendant next challenges the district court's finding
regarding reimbursement for medical and dental expenses for the
parties' minor children.

See finding of fact No. 14 (R. 265).

While purporting to marshall the evidence in support of the
finding by citing the relevant pages in the record, Defendant
utterly fails to meet his burden of marshalling all the evidence
and demonstrating

that such is insufficient

to support the

finding.
A simple review of the Defendant's testimony regarding
his claim for reimbursement of the medical and dental expenses
supports the district court's finding regarding the offset for the
same.
Q. (By Mr. Olsen) And you have attached to
that document all checks that you've paid
medical bills; is that true?
A.

(By Defendant) Yes.

Q
And there are no checks whatsoever in
relation to what you claim to be copayments; is
that true?
A.

That's true.

. . . .

Q. Okay, and the doctors you owed, you have
got all the checks I requested by interrogatories attached there, are they not?
A.

They are.

Q. And if I tell you I've gone through those
and the total amount of those checks is — that
18

a total amount of those checks -- I divide them
differently.
There was $1,331.19 paid to a
Grant Weber, a collection outfit; is that
correct?
A.

That's true.

Q. And you got a letter from them. Therefs no
checks on those.
There's some checks you'd
sent but they don't total $1,331.19.
A. That's true. I knew that I would need a
statement from them stating I did pay it in
full.
Q. I see. There's a bunch of checks there but
as I recall, those are only about $500, but you
said you paid $1,331 and got a statement from
them.
A. They stated
thirteen --

in that paper that

I paid

Q. But anyway, if I add all those things
together that you've got checks for, I end up
with approximately thirty-seven, thirty-eight
hundred dollars. I think in your document —
let me see your document, Exhibit 5. Shows you
have checks for $2,369.44; is that correct?
A.

Uh huh (affirmative)

Q. And in addition to that, you have the
$1,331.19 you paid to collection outfit?
A.

Right.

Q. Now, it's true, is it not, that of this
$2,369 some thing, there are some—are there
any checks in here made payable to this
collection outfit?
A.

To which collection--

Q. CPC,
Olympus
View
Hospital
or
the
collection company that was handling that.
A.

To Grant Wiley?
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Q. What I'm saying is you got a statement from
the collection agency that you paid $1,331 and
there are some checks to that collection
outfit.
A.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q. That's paying the whole-- they don't total
$1,331 and that's payment on that $1,331' is
that correct?
A. If a company states that I paid them a
certain amount of money, I believe that is the
amount I paid them.
Q. That isn't what I'm getting at.
You're
duplicating things. If you've got checks in
there made payable to that company, they are a
payment on that $1331; is that true?
A. I pulled out all of the checks to Grant
Webber that I paid to them.
They were not
added twice.
Q. Okay, so if we take your documents as all
being paid, the $1,331 and the 23, we have
total amount of, the way I calculate it, of
thirty-six -- no an even $4,000.63.

Q. And that's the only checks you have, is
that true, what you've got attached.
A. At this time I'm sure that's just a portion
of what I paid.
(R. 313-18).
It is abundantly clear that based upon the foregoing
testimony, the list of medical and dental expenses that the
Defendant provided to the court was wholly inconsistent with the
documentation verifying those expenses.

Of particular note, the

defendant testified that he did not have any checks for those
amounts representing co-payments which amounted to approximately
$6,000.00.

Further, counsel for the Plaintiff elicited specific
20

testimony

that

the Defendant

duplicated

medical

and

dental

expenses by setting forth the appropriate amount due the medical
or dental provider as well as those same amounts being collected
by collection agencies.

Inasmuch as the district court had an

opportunity to weigh the evidence provided by the Defendant in
addition to the testimony and other evidence elicited by the
Plaintiff in relation to the medical expenses, this court should
not superimpose its judgment of such evidence, particularly where
there was sufficient evidence to support the finding in question.7
POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS IN THE AMOUNT OF $4,308.00.
Finally, Defendant challenges the district court's award
and underlying findings regarding attorney fees. "The decision to
award

costs

and

attorney

fees

in divorce

and

modification

proceedings lies within the sound discretion of the trial court."
Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 726 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Utah
Code Ann. sec. 30-3-3 (1989 & Supp. 1994).

"However, to recover

costs and attorney fees in proceedings on a petition to modify a
divorce decree, the requesting party must demonstrate his or her
need for attorney fees, the ability of the other spouse to pay,
and the reasonableness of the fees. Ld. (citing Morgan v. Morgan,

This court should likewise note that the Defendant does
not necessarily challenge the reimbursement claim for
medical and dental expenses by the Plaintiff set forth in
Exhibit 23 and Exhibit 24.
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854 P.2d 559, 568 (Utah App.)/ cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah
1993).
In the case at bar, the district court made explicit
findings

regarding

each

of

the

foregoing

factors,

and

the

Defendant has failed to marshall or attack those findings; this
court may presume the validity of the same.

Speci-fically, with

respect to the Plaintiff's need and the Defendant's ability to
pay, the court found that "Plaintiff is presently unemployed and
has assessed income to Plaintiff of minimum wage, or Seven Hundred
Fifty-Four

($754.00) Dollars

per month.

That

Defendant

is

employed by Salt Lake County and has gross income of Three
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Nine ($3,259.00) Dollars. See Finding
of Fact No. 10 (R. 264). Moreover, as to the reasonableness of
the requested fee, the court found:
13. That Plaintiff has been required to
employ counsel in defending the actions by
Defendant, and Plaintiff's counsel's fees were
necessary and were reasonable based upon the
time and expenditures made on behalf of the
Plaintiff and it is fair and reasonable that
Plaintiff be awarded judgment against Defendant
for reasonable attorney fees in the sum of Four
Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Eight ($4,198.00)
Dollars, together with costs in the amount of
One Hundred Ten ($110.00) Dollars, for a
judgment of total attorney fees and costs of
Four Thousand Three Hundred Eight ($4,308.00)
Dollars.
Finding of Fact No. 13 (R. 265).
Inasmuch as the district court considered each of the
necessary

factors

in awarding

attorney

fees

in the present

modification case, the court did not abuse its discretion in doing
so.
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POINT VI
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.
"Generally, when a trial court awards fees in a divorce
[or modification] action to a party who then prevails on appeal,
that party will also be entitled to fees on appeal." Larson, 888
P.2d at 727 (citing Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App.
1991).

Here, in the event that the Plaintiff prevails or

substantially prevails on appeal, this court should remand this
action to the district court for an award of reasonable attorney
fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this court should: (1) determine
that the decree of divorce in this matter is sufficiently clear
and unambiguous; (2) uphold the findings of the district court as
to child support arrearages, alimony arrearages, and medical and
dental expense reimbursement; (3) determine that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the Plaintiff
attorney fees and costs in the amount of $4,308.00; and (4)
determine that the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable
attorney fees incurred in defending the present appeal.
DATED this

f

day of

A^AQkN-x^"

/ 1995.

NOLAN J. OLSEN
~7^
Attorney for Plain^ff/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

\

day of

/WcuA-^,7

/

1995, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE, postage prepaid thereon, to:
MARY C. CORPORON, Esq.
TERRY R. SPENCER, Esq.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM "A"
COPY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE
DATED FEBRUARY 8, 1991

Third Jucoiat D'&n>ct

FEB 0 8 1991

NOLAN J. OLSEN
Utah State Bar No. 2464
OLSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: 255-7176
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ai^asas
REGINA LYNN NELL,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.
SANDY KEVIN NELL,
Defendant.

Civil No.

904904147

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick

The above-entitled matter having come on to be heard
on the 22nd day of January, 1991, before Commissioner Michael
Evans, plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney, Nolan
J. Olsen, and defendant appearing in person and by his attorney,
Martin J. Pezely, and plaintiff and defendant having stipulated
in open court, and plaintiff and defendant having each approved
the stipulation in open court, and the court having approved -he
stipulation, and plaintiff having been sworn and testified
concerning the allegations of her Complaint, and the court having
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and upon motion of Nolan J. Olsen, attorney for
plaintiff, and good cause appearing therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1. That the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing
between plaintiff, REGINA LYNN NELL, and defendant, SANDY KEVIN
NELL, be and the same are hereby dissolved.
1. That plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the
care, custody and control of the three children born as issue of
said marriage, to-wit: Mandy Lynn Nell, born February 26, 1976;
Travis Sandy Nell, born November 25, 1977; and Trenton J. Nell,
born April 12, 1980, subject to the right of reasonable
visitations by the defendant which shall include but not be
restricted to the following:
a. alternating weekends from Friday at 6:00
p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m., with the express provision that due
to the fact defendant's work schedule requires him to work
weekends on occasion, the parties will work out the weekends such
that defendant can have two weekends each month;
b. alternating holidays;
c. Father's Day and defendant's birthday;
d. a portion of children's birthdays;
e. Christmas Eve from 12:00 noon until 5:00
p.m,
f.
g.

Christmas Day from 1:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.;
a minimum of two weeks each summer for

vacation;
h. such other times as the parties may agree.
Plaintiff shall have the children on Mother's Day
and plaintiff's birthday.
2. That plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the

use of the home and real property located at 2195 West 13250
South, Riverton, Utah, until such time as one of the following
contingencies occur, to-wit:
a. plaintiff remarries;
b. plaintiff cohabitates with an individual of
the opposite sex;
c. youngest child reaches majority;
d. plaintiff desires to sell said home;
e. plaintiff no longer resides in said home.
When the first of the above contingencies occur,
said home will be immediately placed for sale and from the
proceeds from said sale, the sums will be distributed as follows:
a. all costs and expenses of sale including
real estate commissions;
b. the balance due on the mortgage;
c. any costs of repairs to sell said home;
d.
plaintiff will be reimbursed for any
reduction of mortgage commencing in February, 1991, until date of
sale;
e. plaintiff and defendant will equally divide
the remaining balance.
3. That plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as
her sole and separate property the furniture, furnishings and
fixtures located in the home, with the exception of certain
personal property as agreed to by the parties which will be
awarded to defendant; 1983 Cadillac; 1982 Voltswagon Rabbit; onehalf of savings bonds; one-half of 401k at defendant's place of
employment as of December 31, 1990; one-half of defendant's

retirement at Utah State Retirement Fund as of December 31, 1990;
and her personal belongings.
4. That defendant be and he is hereby awarded as
his sole and separate property the 1975 Ford pickup; motorcycle;
trail bike; 4 wheel ATV; 3 wheel ATV; one-half of savings bonds;
one-half of 401k at defendant's place of employment as of
December 31, 1990; one-half of defendant's retirement at Utah
State Retirement Fund as of December 31, 1990; and his personal
belongings.
5. That a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall
be signed by the court awarding to plaintiff one-half interest in
defendant's 401k plan and retirement at Salt Lake County and Utah
State Retirement Fund.
6. That plaintiff be and she is hereby ordered to
assume and pay the mortgage on the home due American Savings;
Jordan School Credit Union; LDS Social Services; South Jordan
City; and any other debts she has incurred since the filing of
the Complaint.
7. That defendant be and he is hereby ordered to
assume and pay the Salt Lake County Credit Union; Internal
Revenue Services; Larry Peterson on medical bills; miscellaneous
medical bills incurred during the marriage; and any other debts
he had incurred since the filing of the Complaint, and hold
plaintiff harmless therefrom.
8 . That defendant be and he is hereby ordered to
pay to plaintiff rhe sum of $196.33 per child per month, a total
of $589.00 per rronth, for the support and maintenance of the
minor children, a copy of said child support obligation worksheet

<k

* /\ *

*

is attached hereto marked Exhibit "A", with the express provision
that pursuant to the statute of the State of Utah that when each
child reaches majority the child support shall be adjusted based
on the Child Support Schedule. Defendant shall subtract from the
child support as set forth above the costs of medical insurance
on the minor children. Defendant shall pay said child support
until each child reaches majority or completes high school
whichever occurs last. Defendant shall pay one-half of said
child support on or before the 5th day of each month and one-half
on or before the 20th day of each month.
9. That defendant be and he is hereby ordered to
pay to plaintiff the sum of $400.00 per month as alimony until
defendant remarries, cohabitates, or dies, or there is a
substantial change of circumstances by reason of plaintiff's
graduating from college and obtaining higher paying employment.
10. That plaintiff and defendant be and they are
hereby ordered to maintain medical insurance on the minor
children as long as a policy is available at their place of
employment, and plaintiff and defendant should each be ordered to
pay one-half of medical and dental expenses not covered by
insurance.
11. That plaintiff and defendant be and they are
hereby ordered to maintain the children as beneficiaries on their
present group life insurance policies.
12. That plaintiff and defendant be and they are
hereby ordered to assume and discharge their individual attorney
fees and courts costs.

*! Jft<• £ *

DATED this

\

day of ^
AAJWHAA.
BY THE COURT

tf

1991,

SAWDRAH*B3fcK

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ,-ffiffi- day of\
1991, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing tTECREE
DIVORCE, to:

Martin J. Pezely, Attorney for Defendant, 23 Maple

Street, Midvale, Utah

84047, postage prepaid thereon.

r
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ADDENDUM "B"
COPY OF FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DATED JANUARY 20, 1995

NOLAN J. OLSEN
Utah State Bar No. 2464
OLSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: 255-7176
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REGINA LYNN NELL,
:
:

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

:

SANDY KEVIN NELL,

i

Civil No. 90 4 90 4147 DA

:

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the
21st

day

of

December,

1994, before

the

Honorable

J.

Dennis

Frederick; Plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney Nolan
J. Olsen; and Defendant appearing in person and by his attorney,
Terry R. Spencer; and Plaintiff and Defendant having submitted
evidence to the Court; and Plaintiff

and Defendant

and other

witnesses having testified; and the Court having consolidated the
civil case of Sandy
940902163;

and

the

Kevin

Nell

Court

vs.

having

Regina
taken

Lynn

Nell,

said

Civil No.

matter

under

advisement; and the Court having made its ruling on the 22nd day
of December, 1994, and good cause appearing therefor; and the
Court having been fully advised in the premises now makes the
following:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That Defendant's civil action as against Plaintiff

pursuant to Civil No. 940902163, was consolidated for trial with
Defendant's Petition for Modification and Plaintiff's CounterPetition for Modification, in the above matter.
2.

That Defendant alleged in his Petition to Modify that

there had been a change of circumstances, as to distribution of
monies

from

the

sale of

the home

and

as

to the payment

of

Plaintiff and Defendant's parents. The Court, however, determined
that there was no substantial change of circumstances, as to said
matter,
3.

That

Defendant

alleges

in

his

civil

action

and

Petition to Modify, that Paragraph 2 of the Divorce Decree was
ambiguous.

The Court determined, however, that Paragraph 2 is not

ambiguous and that the provisions set forth by Paragraph 2 is the
determining

factor

in relation

to the division

of

the money

received from the sale of the home.
4.

That the Lis Pendens filed as Entry No. 5783080 in

Book 6909, Page 1157/1158 on the 1st day of April, 1994 in che
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, be and the same
is hereby dismissed, terminated and discharged.
5.

That

Merrill

Title

Company

be

and

it

ordered to deliver the Seven Thousand Two Hundred
Dollars held

in escrow pursuant

to the sale of

is hereby
($7,200.00)

the property

located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to wit:

"Lot 1302

Mountain View Estates #13", to the Plaintiff, Regina Lynn Nell.
6.

That: Plaintiff remarried on September 5, 1994, and

based upon said marriage, alimony terminated on said date.
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7.

That pursuant

to the Counter-Claim

on

the

civil

action Number 940902163, the accounting of monies pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of the Complaint provides that Defendant owes to
Plaintiff the sum of One Thousand Six Hundred Thirty and 67/100
($1,630.67) Dollars.
8.
of

Five

That Defendant has failed to pay alimony in the sum

Thousand

Eighty-Three

($5,083.00)

Dollars

prior

to

February, 1994, and Plaintiff should be granted judgment against
Defendant

for delinquent

alimony in the sum of Five Thousand

Eighty-Three ($5,083.00) Dollars.
9.

That pursuant co statute of the State of Utah and the

Divorce Decree provision as to child support for the two

(2)

remaining children in the custody of Plaintiff, and based upon
Plaintiff's Counter-Petition, the child support is established at
Seven

Hundred

Twenty-Three

($723.00)

Dollars

per

month,

and

Plaintiff is granted judgment against Defendant for arrearage in
child support of One Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Two and 04/100
($1,982.04)

Dollars,

being

the

difference

between

the

child

support paid by Defendant and the child support schedule amount
pursuant to Plaintiff's Exhibit.
10. That

Plaintiff

is

presently

unemployed

and

has

assessed income to Plaintiff of minimum wage, or Seven Hundred
Fifty-Four
employed

by

($754.00)
Salt

Dollars

Lake

County

per
and

month.

That

has gross

Defendant

income

of

is

Three

Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Nine ($3,259.00) Dollars.
11. That it is fair and reasonable that Defendant be
ordered to pay to Plaintiff child support for the two (2) minor
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children, the sum of Seven Hundred Twenty-Seven ($727.00) Dollars
per month, commencing in January, 1995.
12. That

it is hereby ordered

that Universal

Income

Withholding be effected pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
62A-11-502.

Further, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section

62A-13-502(4) (b) , an order assessing a Seven ($7.00) Dollar per
month check processing fee shall be withheld and paid to the
Office

of

Recovery

Services

for

the

purposes

of

income

withholding.
It is further ordered that the Uniform Income Withholding
be and is hereby ordered withheld for child care expense pursuant
to this Decree of Divorce.
13. That Plaintiff has been required to employ counsel
in defending the actions by Defendant, and Plaintiff's counsel's
fees were necessary and were reasonable based upon the time and
expenditures made on behalf

of Plaintiff

and it is fair and

reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded judgment against Defendant
for reasonable attorneys' fees in the sum of Four Thousand One
Hundred Ninety-Eight ($4,198.00) Dollars, together with costs in
the amount of One Hundred Ten ($110.00) Dollars, for a judgment of
total attorneys' fees and costs of Four Thousand Three Hundred
Eight ($4,308.00) Dollars.
14. That Defendant had paid medical and dental bills for
the children of the parties, and pursuant to the Divorce Decree
Plaintiff was to reimburse Defendant for one-half

(M) of said

medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance, and based
upon the expenditures shown by the evidence presented by Plaintiff
and Defendant, Defendant should have an offset from above set
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forth judgment in the sum of One Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety and
83/100 ($1,890.83) Dollars for the one-half (Ji) medical and dental
expenses, which are attributable to the Plaintiff.
15. That based'upon the judgments as set forth above and
the offset

for medical

expenses, Plaintiff

judgment against Defendant

should be

awarded

in the sum of Eleven Thousand One

Hundred Twelve and 88/100 ($11,112.88) Dollars.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That Defendant's Petition to Modify be and the same

is hereby denied, as to distribution of funds from the sale of the
home and payment of Plaintiff and Defendant's parents.
2.

That Plaintiff's Complaint in the civil action Civil

No. 940902163, be and the same is hereby dismissed, as no cause of
action.
3.
against

That Plaintiff be and she is hereby granted judgment

Defendant

based

upon

her

Counter-claim

in Civil No.

940902163, in the sum of One Thousand Six Hundred Thirty and
67/100 ($1,630.67) Dollars.
4.

That

Plaintiff's

alimony

terminated

September

5,

5.

That Plaintiff should be granted judgment against

1994.

Defendant for the sum of Five Thousand Eighty-Three

($5,083.00)

Dollars delinquent alimony.
6.

That Plaintiff should be granted judgment against

Defendant for the sum of One Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Two and
04/100 ($1,982.04) Dollars delinquent child support.
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7.

That Plaintiff should be awarded judgment against

Defendant for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of court in the
sum of Four Thousand Three Hundred Eight ($4,308.00) Dollars, for
the use and benefit of Plaintiff's counsel.
8.

That the Divorce Decree in the above-entitled matter

should be modified as follows:
a.

That Defendant

should be ordered

to pay

to

Plaintiff child support for the two (2) minor children
in

the

Dollars

sum

of

per

Seven

month,

Hundred

Twenty-Seven

commencing

January,

($727.00)
1995

and

continuing until the children reach the age of majority
or

complete

high

school

in

their

normal

graduating

class, whichever occurs last.
b.

That when the oldest child reaches majority,

that Defendant should be ordered to pay child support to
Plaintiff for the one

(1) child in her custody, based

upon the income of Plaintiff and Defendant at the date
the said oldest child reaches majority or completes high
school in his normal graduating class, whichever occurs
last.
9.

That mandatory withholding should be ordered.
DATED this

W a a y
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of January, 1995.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of January,

1995, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, postage prepaid, to the following:
Terry R. Spencer
Attorney for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM "C"
COPY OF ORDER MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCE
DATED JANUARY 20, 1995

M U ZO '9S5
'

NOLAN J. OLSEN
Utah State Bar No. 2464
OLSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: 255-7176

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REGINA LYNN NELL,

n\(j> 33Q.>
*°

:
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
SANDY KEVIN NELL,

Civil No. 90 490 4147 DA

Defendant.

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick

The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the
21st

day

of

December,

1994, before

the

Honorable

J.

Dennis

Frederick; Plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney Nolan
J. Olsen; and Defendant appearing in person and by his attorney,
Terry R. Spencer; and Plaintiff and Defendant having submitted
evidence to the Court; and Plaintiff

and Defendant

and other

witnesses having testified; and the Court having consolidated the
civil case
940902163;

of Sandy
and

the

Kevin

Nell

Court

vs.

having

Regina
taken

Lynn

Nell,

said

Civil No.

matter

under

advisement; and the Court having made its ruling on the 22nd day
of December, 1994, and good cause appearing therefor; and the
court having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusicns of Law, and upon motion of Nolan J. Olsen, attorney
for Plaintiff, and good cause appearing therefor,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

That Defendant's Petition to Modify be and the same

is hereby denied, as to distribution of funds from the sale of the
home and payment of Plaintiff and Defendant's parents.
2.

That Plaintiff's Complaint in the civil action Civil

No. 940902163, be and the same is hereby dismissed, as no cause of
action.
3.
against

That Plaintiff be and she is hereby granted judgment

Defendant

based upon

her

Counter-claim

in Civil No.

940902163, in the sum of One Thousand Six Hundred Thirty and
67/100 ($1,630.67) Dollars.
4.

That the Lis Pendens filed as Entry No. 5783080 in

Book 6909, Page 1157/1158 on the 1st day of April, 1994 in the
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, be and the same
is hereby dismissed, terminated and discharged.
5.

That

Merrill

Title

Company be and

it

ordered to deliver the Seven Thousand Two Hundred
Dollars held

in escrow pursuant

is hereby
($7,200.00)

to the sale of the property

located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to wit:

"Lot 1302

Mountain View Estates #13", to the Plaintiff, Regina Lynn Nell.
6.

That the Divorce Decree in the above-entitled matter

be and it is hereby modified as follows:
a.

That

Plaintiff's

alimony

be

and

is

hereby

terminated as of September 5, 1994.
b.

That Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to

pay to Plaintiff child support for the two
children

in

the

sum

of

Seven

Hundred

(2) minor

Twenty-Seven

($727.00) Dollars per month, commencing January, 1995
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and

continuing

majority

or

until

the

complete

children

high

reach

school

in

the

their

age

of

normal

graduating class, whichever occurs last.
c.

That when the oldest child reaches majority,

that Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay child
support

to

Plaintiff

for

upon

the

the

one

custody,

based

Defendant

at the date the said oldest child

majority

or

completes

income

(1) child

high

of

school

in

her

Plaintiff

in

his

and

reaches
normal

graduating class, whichever occurs last.
7.
against

That Plaintiff be and she is hereby granted judgment

Defendant

for the

sum

of

Five

Thousand

Eighty-Three

($5,083.00) Dollars delinquent alimony.
8.

That Plaintiff be and she is hereby granted judgment

against Defendant for the sum of One Thousand Nine Hundred EightyTwo and 04/100 ($1,982.04) Dollars delinquent child support.
9.

That

it is hereby ordered

that Universal

Income

Withholding be effected pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
62A-11-502.

Further, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section

62A-11-502(4) (b) , an order assessing a $7.00 per month
processing

fee

shall be

withheld

and paid

to the

check

Office

of

Recovery Services for the purposes of income withholding.
It is further ordered that the Uniform Income Withholding
be and is hereby ordered withheld for child care expense pursuant
to this Decree of Divorce.
10. That Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded judgment
against Defendant

for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of
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court in the sum of Four Thousand Three Hundred Eight ($4,308.00)
Dollars, for the use and benefit of Plaintiff's counsel.
11. That Defendant be and he is hereby awarded a set off
of

One

Thousand

Eight

Dollars for the one-half

Hundred

Ninety

and

83/100

($1,890.83)

(M) medical and dental expenses, which

are attributable to the Plaintiff.
12. That based upon the judgments as set forth above and
the offset for medical expenses, Plaintiff be and she is hereby
awarded judgment against Defendant in the sum of Eleven Thousand
One Hundred Twelve and 88/100 ($11,112.88) Dollars.
DATED this

yjOJ^day of January, 1995.
BY THE ICOURT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

/

/

1995, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER AND
JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, to the following:
Terry R. Spencer
Attorney for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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